Foreign investments are in the focus of most governments around the world. In order to be able to set a policy agenda that is successful in promoting FDI, it is necessary to understand the determinants of foreign investments. This paper examines whether, and to what extent, sound institutions and the degree of regulation deter or attract FDI flows in four economies of south-eastern Europe. In a dynamic panel analysis, a broad set of institutional and regulatory variables that may affect the decision of foreign investors to undertake investment projects in this region is examined, using firm-level data. Analysis shows that the quality of the institutional environment significantly influences foreign capital. Governments in this region should, therefore, focus primarily on creating an effective legal system, having relatively stable political and economic conditions.
Introduction
Since the early 1990s, development literature has aimed at exploring the role of institutions and regulations in economic growth. Solid laws and well-defined property rights, sound political and economic institutions, and efficient regulation of the economy are viewed as basic factors that determine macroeconomic stability, capital market development, business sector development and investment in innovation. The successful establishment and maintenance of sound institutions 110 E. A. Kaditi are, therefore, expected to exert their positive influence on economic growth through the promotion of foreign direct investments (FDI), among other things. However, foreigners' capital is more 'footloose' than domestic capital and is likely to be more sensitive to institutional deficiencies. Moreover, the impact of institutions on FDI depends on the effectiveness of a country's regulations. Weak institutions, which may lead to corruption, reduce development in countries where regulations are effective, but may foster economic growth when regulations are ineffective.
In this framework, a number of papers have studied the relationship between institutions and/or regulations and economic growth in general or capital market development in particular. Using various econometric techniques, several studies conclude that sound institutions can encourage private (foreign) investments, improve the overall efficiency of the economic system and significantly contribute to economic growth in the long-run. For instance, the works of Globerman & Shapiro (2002) and Stern (2003) showed that the quality of institutions and the economy's regulatory system have a significant impact on FDI, especially in developing and transition countries. Wei (2000) pointed out corruption as a significant obstacle to attract FDI; whereas Daude & Stein (2007) used a wider range of institutional variables and showed that FDI is significantly influenced by the quality of institutions. Alfaro et al. (2008) also examined the lack of flows of capital from rich to poor countries and concluded that foreign investments might be a channel through which low institutional quality negatively affects long-run development. Moreover, Habib & Zurawicki (2002) examined the impact of institutional distance on bilateral FDI and found that the absolute difference of the corruption index between the investor and the host country has a negative impact on bilateral FDI. Using a sample of 89 countries, Busse & Groizard (2006) also support the idea that foreign investments only stimulate growth in countries that have sound institutions and lower levels of regulation. Finally, Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) concluded that, although institutional reforms can be detrimental to FDI in the short-run, FDI tends to rise more over time between countries with converging institutions.
This paper examines whether, and to what extent, sound institutions and the degree of regulation deter or attract FDI flows in four economies of south-eastern Europe (SEE). In particular, the analysis regards Greece (GR), a mature economy and member state of the Eurozone, two new Member States of the European Union (EU), namely Bulgaria (BG) and Romania (RO), and a candidate country, Croatia (HR). These economies are interesting to explore regarding the impact of institutional quality and the effectiveness of regulations on FDI, since it is generally argued that institutional variables might be important determinants of FDI in transition economies, but less so in the more mature economies of Europe. As explained in a following section, the institutional and regulatory frameworks of the three sample countries have been reformed to various extents in the process of transition from state planning to the market economy, whereas governments in these economies compete with each other in terms of foreign-specific investment incentives to attract FDI in order to foster economy growth. In fact, all three transition countries have become especially attractive for foreign investors over the last years. At the same time, weak institutions appear to negatively affect Foreign Investments and Institutional Convergence in South-eastern Europe 111 foreign investments in Greece, despite recent deregulation. Consequently, this paper aims to empirically examine the importance of institutional convergence in these SEE economies to attract FDI, and to analyse whether the quality of institutions affect the impact of regulations on FDI.
While the existing literature has focused mainly on the effects of institutional variables on FDI using country-level data, this paper contributes by testing a broad set of institutional and regulatory variables that may affect the decision of foreign investors to undertake investment projects, in particular SEE economies using firm-level data. This enables us to ensure the robustness of the results: a dynamic panel analysis is used to examine the factors that promote FDI in SEE economies over the period 1998-2006. On a country-specific level, the paper also explores possible differences between FDI flows in Greece and the other SEE economies owing to differences in their institutional and regulatory frameworks. Firm-level data for the food industry sector are retrieved from the Amadeus database, provided by the Bureau van Dijk in Belgium, which includes information on a number of variables, such as firm employment, sales and equity ownership position. The indicators used for institutions and regulations are based on surveys undertaken by the World Bank, and in particular the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents some general views on foreign investments and the quality of institutions and regulations in the four SEE economies of our interest. Section 3 describes the empirical model and explains the dependent as well as the explanatory variables used in the analysis. Section 4 provides details in terms of the firm-level data and their descriptive statistics; whereas the econometric methodology and the empirical estimates are presented in the following section. Section 6 concludes and outlines some possible directions for future research.
Foreign Investments and Institutions in SEE
Over the last two decades, fundamental changes have taken place in all SEE economies. This region, often referred to as the 'Balkans', remains effectively an area of high interest for the international business and investment community. Foreign direct investments have increased significantly, indicating their major role in the economic development of the region. In particular, the strategic location of this region between Western Europe and the Middle East, the political stability, further progress in institutional reforms, deeper integration with the EU, liberalisation of FDI legislation, the creation of a common free trade area, the comparatively low level of labour cost, and the high skills base, are only a few of the factors that make this region attractive to foreign investors. Moreover, SEE transition economies compete with each other by offering a variety of investment incentive schemes, such as tax holidays, import duty exemptions and subsidies for infrastructure, independently of their potential effectiveness. Greece, on the other hand, provides to foreign investors a political, monetary and exchange rate stability, while offering some of the most advanced infrastructure and sophisticated labour force in the region. A new regulatory framework was also recently launched, which encourages foreign investments through new tax reforms, private investment incentives for economic development and regional convergence and a new law for public-private partnerships. As a result, over the last few years the four SEE economies have experienced a considerable rise in total FDI flows, and for the food industry sector in particular (see Figure 1 ). Bulgaria and Romania were especially attractive and, in 2006, the two economies received ¤15.2 out of ¤27.8 billion. Croatia further received ¤2.7 billion, whereas the FDI flows for Greece amounted to ¤9.1 billion. As the opening up of SEE markets offered new investment opportunities, Greece also ranks among the three leading foreign investors in Bulgaria and Romania, while it is the leading foreign investor in other economies of the region, such as Albania and FYR Macedonia. In fact, Greek direct investments in SEE have exceeded the amount of ¤10 billion over the last decade. Accordingly, Greece contributes to the economic development and stabilisation of the region. 1 All SEE countries have undoubtedly made significant progress in promoting private sector development through privatisation, deregulation and a better business environment; and improving public administration. However, taxation, corruption, lack of access to finance, restrictive labour legislation and the poor quality of regulation are still perceived as the key constraints to invest in SEE economies (Table 1) . For instance, the three transition economies rank better than Greece in terms of the number of procedures necessary to start a business, as well as in terms of the contract enforcement. It is also obvious that Croatia has experienced significant improvements in most indicators over time, as higher values indicate better governance ratings. Croatia has the highest score in terms of political stability, whereas Bulgaria ranks better than the other economies in terms of regulatory quality. Government effectiveness is rather low in Bulgaria and Romania, as are their indicators for the control of corruption. Greece is not an exception, since corruption remains a major obstacle to doing business and its score is even weaker than that for Croatia and Romania. Greece has also a high tax rate and cost for starting businesses. Consequently, there needs to be an even stronger correspondence between the investment climate initiatives proposed by the governments and the concerns of both the private sector and the foreign investor community. Foreign investors went first to Greece, but a question that arises from these figures is whether these investors are willing to stay because of Greece's low scores in particular governance indicators. Data show the relative disadvantages of Greece in terms of costs to start a business, taxes, contract enforcement and corruption; whereas some of the other SEE economies require further institutional reforms. As it is believed that foreign investors tend to move their capital into transition economies once a certain level of institutional quality is attained, this paper empirically examines whether FDI flowing into Greece behave similarly to that flowing into the other three SEE economies, as well as whether the quality of institutions and regulations attracts FDI in this region. Using firm-level data, it will be possible to explicitly control for the characteristics of investing firms that affect their investment decisions. Figure 2 provides some evidence that, at a country-level, strong institutions do not always attract foreign investments in SEE. Higher regulatory quality may positively affect FDI, although corruption seems to provide desired flexibility to foreign investors. 
Methodology

Determinants of Foreign Investments
According to the OLI paradigm of Dunning (1993) , a firm must own a unique asset it wishes to exploit (the Ownership advantage), it must be cost efficient to exploit the asset abroad instead of in the firm's home country (the Location advantage), and it must be in the firm's interest to control the asset's exploitation itself (the Internalisation advantage). Ownership advantages can be superior technologies, reputation, trademarks, brand names or other intangible assets. The most important location factors are market size, the level of economic development, the cost and skill levels of labour, the availability of infrastructure and other resources that facilitate efficient specialisation of production, trade policies, and political and macroeconomic stability. Regulatory factors, such as exchange rates and taxes, as well as institutional factors, are also important to affect the location and the magnitude of FDI.
In terms of the latter, the quality of institutions and regulations depends on governments' credibility and flexibility, respectively. Credible economies undertake strong checks, protecting property rights and ensuring prospective (foreign) investors a reasonable return on investment, while avoiding the possibility of arbitrary governmental discretion. However, a credible commitment may entail the risk of policy rigidity, undermining regulation efficiency and increasing transaction costs. On the other hand, flexibility indicates the economies' capacity to tax and regulate. It may facilitate quick decision-making; however, it may also make policy less accountable in the absence of external checks. Consequently, economies with strong institutions (high credibility) should provide more political safety, while economies with weak institutions (high flexibility) should offer more investment incentives.
In brief, foreign investments are positively affected by local product and factor market development, growth potential, the availability of financing, and 'better' institutions; but they are negatively related to market risks and the costs of doing business. 2 In this framework, the following baseline equation will Foreign Investments and Institutional Convergence in South-eastern Europe 115 be estimated:
where the subscript i denotes the ith firm, j denotes the country and t denotes the time. The disturbance term is specified as a two-way error component model, so that firm heterogeneity is denoted by c i , namely the unobserved or fixed firm-specific effect; whereas year-specific dummies, d t , are included to account for common trends in the volume of FDI stock of the firms. Parameters a, b and l are to be estimated. A set of firm-and country-specific variables likely to be associated with higher FDI are also included. A brief discussion on these explanatory variables follows, whereas the institutional and regulatory variables used in the analysis are presented in detail in the following subsection. It should also be noted that following Smarzynska & Spatareanu (2004) , the dependent variable (FDI) is measured by the percentage of capital (equity) owned by foreign investors in each firm. In particular, FDI stock is calculated by multiplying the percentage of foreign ownership with the total assets of each firm included in the sample for every available year. 3 The first explanatory variable is the dependent variable lagged by one period. The significance of this term will indicate that the investment process at firm-level is a dynamic one. This specification then imposes the methodology used for the empirical estimations, as explained in the following section.
In terms of firm characteristics, seven explanatory variables are included in the analysis. The number of employees indicates each firm's Size and is expected to be positively related to FDI, as larger firms may receive larger amounts of FDI stock. Each firm's years of operation (Age) is also included, as previously stateowned (old) firms are expected to be more experienced at operating in the local markets, so that new firms tend to be less attractive to foreign investors. Moreover, the profits (or losses) of a firm (Profits) may affect an investor's decision. Higher profitability is actually expected to promote higher (future) investments.
In addition, the firm's Operating Costs, and in particular the cost of material inputs and labour costs may be another important factor for foreign investors. As a location advantage, the lower these costs, the more attractive the location becomes. The lagged value of operating costs is included in order to be consistent with the lagged profits and is expected to have a negative sign. To examine possible technological sophistication (ownership advantage), an extra explanatory variable is further employed, which is R&D intensity. As a firm can acquire new technology via its own investments into R&D capital, this variable will indicate whether a firm introduced new technology (i.e. know-how, patents, trademarks, etc) using data on its intangible assets. This factor is likely to be positively related to the dependent variable. On the other hand, credit constrained firms may not be attractive for foreign investors. An explanatory variable indicating the share of debts over the firm's total assets is included, namely Loans. Finally, Taxation is introduced as another cost that is expected to have a negative impact on FDI. This can also be considered as a measure of the economy's regulations. The higher the amount of taxes paid, the lower the likely amount of FDI stock.
Concerning the country control variables, the following factors may affect FDI. Following Habib & Zurawicki (2002) , GDP per capita is considered to reflect high consumption potential in the host country and it is expected to be positively related to FDI. A positive sign for the economy's growth rate of GDP (GDP growth) is also likely, since high growth prospects ensure demand for the output of the local market-oriented FDI. The economy's export orientation may further stimulate foreign investments. Trade openness is included in the analysis, as countries open to international trade provide a better platform for global business operations. A country's international orientation also reflects its competitiveness and it is expected to promote FDI flows. Inflation may strongly affect FDI as well, assuming it adequately reflects a measure of macroeconomic instability (uncertainty). High inflation creates challenges in strategic planning, forecasting of demand and financing of operations, and it is therefore expected to negatively affect FDI. Finally, the quality of Institutions and Regulations is expected to play a significant role in attracting foreign investments. For instance, political stability is considered as an imperative for planning, profitability and long-run success. Corruption produces bottlenecks, heightens uncertainty and raises costs. Inability to handle corruption makes FDI challenging, especially for investors from less corrupt countries and can result in a negative FDI decision. However, corruption may provide some investors with preferential access to profitable markets. Foreign investors may then count on their bargaining power in order to decide whether to invest in an economy plagued by corruption. Overall, weak institutions are expected to deter FDI, whereas high quality institutions attract FDI, depending always on the level of the economy's credibility as well as flexibility.
Institutional Variables
In order to assess the role of institutions and regulations in attracting FDI, a set of governance variables developed by Kaufmann et al. (2009) are employed. These indicators are constructed based on information drawn from 35 data sources provided by 33 different organisations. The data reflect the views on governance of the public and private sector, NGO experts, as well as thousands of citizens and firm survey respondents worldwide. In fact, the so-called Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) cover 212 countries over the period 1996-2008 and include six The first two indicators (VA and PV) are essentially related to the way that authorities are selected and replaced; the GE and RQ indicators refer to the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies (credibility); and the last two variables, RL and CC, consider aspects related to the respect, on the part of both citizens and the government, for the institutions that resolve their conflicts and govern their interactions (flexibility). These six governance indicators are measured in units ranging from about −2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance. In this paper, all measures are rescaled by subtracting the original scores from 2.5, so they now range from 0 to 5.
As variables of institutions are often correlated with one another, it is generally not possible to include several institutional variables in the same equation. Although it is possible to aggregate all these variables into their first principal component, this will imply substitutability between institutional variables that refer to different areas of governance, limiting also the extent to which the relevance of each dimension can be identified. Following Daude & Stein (2007) , those variables that capture similar dimensions will therefore be grouped to reduce possible measurement problems of the individual components. In particular, the average of VA and PV will be used in some regressions as an indicator of Political Stability and Freedom (PF), while the remaining variables will be grouped as the General Government Efficiency (GGE) variable.
All measures of institutional and regulatory quality as well as the firm-and country-specific explanatory variables used in the analysis are presented in detail in Table 2 . 
Institutional variables Voice and Accountability
A measure on political and civil rights.
Political Stability & Absence of Violence
A measure on the likelihood of violent threats to or changes in government.
Government Effectiveness
A measure on the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery.
Regulatory Quality
A measure on the incidence of market-unfriendly policies.
Rule of Law
A measure on the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Control of corruption
A measure on the exercise of public power for private gain.
Firm characteristics (ln)FDI
A firm is classified as foreign-owned if FDI is equal to or more than 10%. If a foreign share is less than 10%, the firm is considered as local.
Size
(ln)Number of employees Micro: Firms with less that 10 full time employees Small: Firms with more or equal to 10 but less than 50 employees Medium: Firms with more or equal to 50 but less than 100 employees Large: Firms with more or equal to 100 but less than 250 employees Very Large: Firms with more or equal to 250 employees.
(ln)Age
Years since the firm began operations in the country.
Profits
Profit or loss after taxation as a share exceeding a firm's operating costs.
Operating Costs
The cost of material inputs and labour cost in terms of a firm's size.
R&D
The share of intangible assets change in terms of a firm's sales.
Loans
The share of debt in terms of a firm's total assets.
Taxation
The share of taxation in terms of a firm's sales. Country variables GDP per capita (ln)GDP per capita.
GDP growth
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita.
Trade Openness
The sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP.
Inflation
Annual percentage change of consumer prices. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The firm-level data used in this paper are retrieved from a commercial database, Amadeus, provided by the Bureau van Dijk in Belgium. This database contains comprehensive information on approximately 5 million firms operating in 35 European countries. In addition to the standard financial statements, this database includes information on the ownership structure of firms, the country of origin of Foreign Investments and Institutional Convergence in South-eastern Europe 119 Table 3 presents information on the characteristics of the firms included in the sample, as well as descriptive statistics for the variables included in the empirical estimations. The majority of the firms were established after 1990, although dates of establishment for the overall sample range between 1821 and 2005. About 60% of the firms have received investments from other EU countries, whereas 5.22% report investments from the US. Germany and the Netherlands are the first two European countries from where foreign investments originate, followed by France and Italy. In terms of the rest of the world, Turkey appears to have the majority of the investments in the sample countries. Most of the firms have received a loan; however, only 22.2% of them have invested in R&D activities. Moreover, 32.9% of the firms paid no taxes in 2006. In terms of firm size, small firms comprise the majority of the sample, with an almost equal proportion of medium, large and very large firms.
Empirical Results
The use of the lagged dependent variable in the right-hand side of equation (1) causes OLS estimators to be biased and inconsistent, whereas the fixed-and random-effects estimators are also biased (Baltagi, 2008) . As a result, a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) procedure will be used, following Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) . Within many panels and few periods, estimators are constructed by first-differencing to remove panellevel effects and using instruments to form moment conditions. In this case, moment conditions are based on both differences and levels. In particular, a system estimator that uses moment conditions in which lagged differences are used as instruments for the level equation in addition to the moment conditions of lagged levels as instruments for the differenced equation is employed. The Windmeijer (2005) biased-corrected two-step robust standard errors are reported.
In all cases, a set of explanatory variables are used in a dynamic panel data analysis to determine the significance of institutions and regulations for FDI and to take into account other important variables related to each firm's ownership and location advantages. The governance variables are assumed to be predetermined instead of strictly exogenous, so that lagged levels are used as instruments. Moreover, a test of autocorrelation and the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions are computed based on Arellano & Bond (1991) and do not suggest any serious problem. 5 The results present strong evidence against the null hypotheses that the overidentifying restrictions are valid, and that there is zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors at order 1. There is also no significant evidence of serial correlation in the first-differenced errors at order 2.
The results are reported in Table 4 and indicate that the institutional and regulatory variables are among the variables that have a statistically significant impact on foreign investments. In Columns 1 to 6, the six governance indicators are included separately. It appears that the coefficients of Government Efficiency, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption bear a significantly negative sign, meaning for instance that 'corruption sands the wheel' reducing the amount of foreign investments. This contradicts the conclusions derived with country-level data (Figure 2) , where it is indicated that corruption may oil the mechanism. The Rule of Law and Control of Corruption are shown to considerably deter FDI, as they are the two quality factors with the highest estimations. The largest impact is associated with the Rule of Law, for which a one standard deviation increase is expected to reduce FDI stocks by a factor of 0.49. That means, for instance, that Greece has to improve this dimension of governance up to the level of Luxembourg or Switzerland to preserve foreign investments. On the contrary, the two indicators related to the way governments are selected and replaced (Voice and Accountability, and Political Stability and Absence of Violence) do not appear to play a vital role in affecting the decision of foreign investors. A similar conclusion is derived when combining these two factors together, as in Column 7 where the impact of Political Stability and Freedom is estimated. Nevertheless, the General Government Efficiency shows a negative and significant impact on FDI, and turns out to be an important factor. The point estimate indicates that the impact of one standard deviation deterioration in this indicator is likely to cause a reduction in FDI stocks by a factor of 0.063. A rise in institutional quality in terms of these governance indicators is therefore shown to attract FDI. Moreover, Table 4 . Empirical results.
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Column 9 presents the results when both an institutional and a regulatory factor are included in the estimation. As already argued, corruption may help circumvent strict regulations, even if the negative impact of corruption prevails. It is therefore examined whether corruption increases FDI flows that are suppressed by rigid regulations, although corruption's impact on FDI is negative. However, the results do not support this argument. The quality of the overall institutional and regulatory environment is again confirmed to be a factor that foreign investors consider when choosing to expand their operation in SEE economies.
In terms of the firm-specific variables, the coefficient of the lagged FDI variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Firms that have received foreign investments may then be more attractive in the future as well. The coefficients for Size and R&D activities are also positive and significant, indicating that investors prefer firms with higher levels of employment and those that can acquire new technology. On the other hand, Loans appear to negatively affect FDI, as expected, whereas the coefficient of Age indicates that firms with experience are more attractive to investors. The key country-specific variables are GDP per capita and Inflation. The former variable produces positive coefficients that are statistically significant, whereas the latter has a negative impact on FDI flows. These are then decisive factors in attracting foreign capital. The coefficient on GDP growth is negative and significant in some of the estimations, which is somewhat counterintuitive, yet not unusual in the literature on the determinants of FDI. Overall, the results remain essentially the same regardless of the measure of institutional and regulatory quality used.
The analysis indicates that foreign investors care about the legal aspects of the economy. However, this does not mean that other factors are not important. In line with the theory, the results suggest that investors are also interested in SEE economies because of their comparative location advantages. In terms of the puzzling estimation of political stability and freedom's impact, a possible interpretation is that these factors are less damaging to FDI than the popular press claims. Consequently, the estimates show that the impact of institutions and regulations on FDI depends on the specific dimension considered.
The regressions presented in Table 4 constrain the effects of institutional and regulatory quality on FDI to be equal across countries. This may be a strong assumption since the sample countries include transition as well as mature economies. An interaction between governance indicators and countries is then introduced to repeat the estimations. Since lower values of these variables correspond to institutions and regulations of higher quality, the estimated coefficients are expected to be negative so that the economy is less attractive to investors. The results presented in Table 5 confirm our previous finding of institutional and regulatory quality being an important factor affecting the investors' decision. The interactions have the expected negative signs and are statistically significant. These results are robust when including the interaction with the grouped governance indicator on government efficiency.
As for the magnitude of the coefficients, all regressions suggest that the effect of institutional and regulatory quality on investment flows is larger for Greece than for the transition economies. For instance, the impact of Regulatory Quality appears to be much higher on foreign investments going to Greece than to the rest 124 E. A. Kaditi of the sample countries. The same conclusion is reached when the measures on Government Effectiveness and the Rule of Law are used. Including these interactions has little impact on the signs or significance levels of the other explanatory variables, so that the estimated coefficients are similar to those of Table 4 . Overall, the results contradict the general argument that institutional and regulatory variables might be important determinants of FDI in transition economies, but less so in the more mature economies such as Greece. In fact, the quality of institutions is an even more important factor in the decision of foreign investors to expand their operations in this country.
Conclusions
Foreign investments are in the focus of most governments around the world. In order to be able to set a particular policy agenda, which is successful in promoting Foreign Investments and Institutional Convergence in South-eastern Europe 125 FDI, it is necessary to understand the determinants of this phenomenon. Using firm-level data for four SEE economies, the importance of a wide range of institutional and regulatory variables as determinants of FDI were explored. The objective of this paper was essentially the analysis of the effectiveness of various policies applied by the host countries in order to attract FDI. The main advantages and weaknesses related to FDI flows for the four SEE economies were identified and compared, so as to illustrate the impact of fundamental characteristics of governance and the business environment on the magnitude of foreign investments. The examination of how much the policy environment in the SEE matters for FDI was also examined.
The obtained results show that better institutions and regulations have overall a positive and significant effect on foreign investments. Government effectiveness, the rule of law and the control of corruption play an essential role in attracting FDI. This means that in addition to its direct influence on the economic performance of a SEE country, institutional and regulatory quality also affects the economy indirectly, through its impact on the level of FDI. It would therefore be wise to further examine the extent of this impact and incorporate the findings into a development strategy. Other firm-and country-specific variables, such as the size, age, R&D intensity and GDP per capita were also proved to have a statistically significant influence on foreign investments. These results are robust for different specifications and institutional or regulatory variables.
As far as the policy implications are concerned, the results of the analysis point to the role of the state as an institutional and regulatory builder. In this role, the governments of SEE economies should focus primarily on creating an efficient legal system. In the past decade, most FDI have gone to those economies that managed to establish an efficient and transparent legal system and had relatively stable political and economic conditions. As institutions converge in the region, governments should pay particular attention so as to retain their foreign investments.
